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GOSSIP AND METAPHYSICS: THE PERSONAL 
TURN IN JURISPRUDENTIAL WRITING 
Michael Ansaldi* 
P ATIERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE. By Neil Duxbury. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press. 1995. Pp. viii, 520. $49.95. 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE. By 
John Henry Schlegel. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 418. $55. 
[D]emocracy must be founded ... on a faith that in the long run ideas 
are more important than the men who form them. 
- Lon L. Fuller1 
I like persons better than principles, and I like persons with no princi-
ples better than anything else in the world. 
- Oscar Wtlde2 
The Franco-Rumanian existentialist E.M. Cioran once opined 
that the two most interesting things in this world are gossip and 
metaphysics.3 For those so minded - and I confess I am among 
them - the combined prospect of gossip about metaphysicians, the 
details of Hannah Arendt's affair with Martin Heidegger,4 for ex-
ample, or of Bertrand Russell's physical gifts,5 provides a special 
frisson, a ne plus ultra of satiated prurience. The desire to be in this 
particular know, for me at any rate, is quite literally irresistible. 
It is tempting, of course, to ascribe this to the general depravity 
of the age of People magazine: why should Luftmenschen Iniss out 
on the simple pleasures of the homme moyen sensuel? Enquiring 
(master-) minds want to know too. Hence, the philosopher as ce-
lebrity. For "Wallis and Edward" or "Burt and Loni," just substi-
tute "Jean-Paul and Simone" or "[famous logical positivist] and 
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College. A.B. 1975, Columbia; B.A. 1977, Oxford; 
J.D. 1983, Yale; M.A. 1986, Oxford. - Ed. I would like to thank Hugh Ault, Sanford Katz, 
Aviam Soifer, and Catharine Wells for reading an earlier draft of this essay. 
1. LoN L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF llSELF 122-23 (1940). 
2. OsCAR WILDE, The Picture Of Dorian Gray (1891), reprinted in PLAYS, PROSE WRIT-
INGS AND POEMS 67, 78 (Everyman's Lib. 1972). 
3. See Joseph Brodsky, Isaiah Berlin at Eighty, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Aug. 17, 1989, at 44, 45. 
4. See generally EIZBIETA ErnNGER, HANNAH ARENDT/MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1995). 
5. See A.L. ROWSE, GLIMPSES OF THE GREAT 13-14 (1985). 
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[rough-trade boyfriend]." And, as we know full well in this demo-
cratic age, we often need our celebrities taken down a peg or two to 
offset their fame. They're just people, you know, "no different from 
anybody else," or so one imagines the leveler's gibe. Indeed, one 
well-known philosophy don at Oxford who turned her hand to liter-
ature was accused, for her troubles, of writing not so much novels as 
Harlequin romances for intellectuals. 6 
In reality, this curiosity about the lives of philosophers is not an 
entirely recent phenomenon. It dates back at least as far as Xeno-
phon's and Diogenes Laertius' tale-telling biographies of Socrates, 
not to mention the autobiographies of Augustine of Hippo and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or Montaigne's Meditations. Nonetheless, 
what was known popularly about philosophers - as opposed to 
their philosophies - tended to be limited to vignettes from their 
lives served up as inspirational exempla: Aquinas resisting the pros-
titutes his brother sent to tempt him;7 Kant's nightly stroll through 
Konigsberg, so punctual that housewives set their watches by it; the 
assiduous Marx facing that daily pile of books in the British Mu-
seum. The aforementioned Diogenes Laertius, who wrote Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers8 sometime in the third century A.O., had no 
significant epigonoi. Apart from him, thus, we lack real philosophi-
cal analogues to Suetonius' Lives of the Twelve Caesars or Vasari's 
Lives of Renaissance Artists, at least until relatively modem times. 
Indeed, it is probably fair to say that the instinctive reaction of a 
"premodem" educated sensibility to the inside scoop on Marx's 
mistreatment of his children, for example, probably would have 
been something along the lines of: "What's that got to do with his 
ideas? Does it invalidate them? Does it shed any light on them? If 
not, why should I care?" The unstated premise was that ideas -
particularly philosophical ideas - should stand or fall on their own. 
Literature offers an instructive comparison here. The lives of 
poets and novelists long have b.een a subject of enormous interest. 
Such interest often rests on the not entirely implausible, but ulti-
mately reductionist, notion, held by much of the public, that their 
works are, in some direct way, really "about" their lives, and hence 
that a more detailed knowledge of the latter necessarily will en-
hance or clarify their appreciation of the former. A strong reaction 
against this sentiment emerged in the post-World War I era in the 
form of the so-called New Criticism. The New Critics taught that 
6. This barb was made in a review of a novel by Iris Murdoch, a prolific author of fiction 
and philosophy. I now, however, no longer can locate the original source. 
7. This story is apparently hagiographers' legend. See W.A. Wallace & J.A. Weisheipl, St. 
Thomas Aquinas, in 14 NEW CA1HOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 102, 103 (William J. McDonald et al. 
eds., 1967). The fictional nature of the story, however, only underscores my point. 
8. DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PmLOSOPHERS {R.D. Hicks, trans., Loeb 
Classical Library 1925). 
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the meaning of a work of art should be sought without reference to 
biographical or historical data about how it arose. Many artists -
such as the poet W.H. Auden and the novelists Evelyn Waugh and 
Gore Vidal - reinforced this message by pleading with readers to 
confine their attentions to words and leave artists' lives alone, tak-
ing the position that knowledge of their lives was essentially irrele-
vant to their works. These protestations, however, reflected an 
understandable desire for privacy as much as their artistic principle, 
and Waugh and Vidal may have undercut their position b,y eventu-
ally publishing books of memoirs.9 
The latest nouvelle vague to hit the shores of American legal 
academe or, at any rate, the latest vague I've caught- deconstruc-
tionism - by rights ought to leave us uninterested in the low-level 
folk who merely sling signs and thereby create texts. As we now 
know, it is not they who give them meaning, but rather I, the 
reader, happily at work in my interpretive community, humble 
lecteur revealed at last as true auteur. 
* * * 
As may befit a discussion of American jurisprudence, let me 
start out with a rather Langdellian move, and present some classifi-
cations - ideal-types, if you will - of jurisprudential writing.10 
These classifications are all fairly standard, nothing exotic. Further-
more, my listing hardly will be exhaustive; I wouldn't dream of it. I 
only aim to identify some significant and recurring types. 
1. The Primary Source: A work in which an author presents his own 
ideas on one or more abstract questions about law - such as whether 
it exists, what it is, where it comes from, and its relationship to justice 
or morality. Such works might include John Rawls's A Theory of Jus.J. ! 
tice11 or John Austin's The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.12 
They also might include works of shorter compass, such as Lon 
Fuller's law review article Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 13 to take a famous example. In any event, the juris-
prudential ideas of a thinker, directly presented by him, are the hall-
mark of this type of writing. "Primary jurisprudence" might be 
another name for it. 
2. The Topical Collection of primary sources by various authors: 
Thomas Grey's The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 14 for example, or 
9. See GORE VIDAL, PALIMPSEST (1995); EVELYN WAUGH, A LITrLE LEARNING (1964). 
10. Actual works of jurisprudence naturally may exhibit features of more than one type. 
11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
12. JoHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rawls 
ed., 1995). 
13. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). · . 
14. THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY (1983). 
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Feinberg & Grass's Justice: Selected Readings15 would fall under this 
heading. Topical collections may present a wide range of opinion or a 
narrow one, in which case they approximate my 'fype 1. The ideas 
illustrated, however, and their worth in explaining legal phenomena, 
again lie at the heart of such works. 
3. The Critique: This is an intellectual response to ideas presented in 
prinlary sources like the foregoing. Owen Fiss's The Death of the 
Law?16 and Mari Matsuda's Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted 
Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of 
Justice belong here.17 A critique, naturally, also may serve as a vehi-
cle for the presentation, or sharpening, of the critic's own ideas. 
4. The Restatement: This category includes works, or portions of 
works, in which the author attempts to restate, perhaps more plainly 
or vividly, the jurisprudential ideas of another. Robert Gordon's 
Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law1B might sit at 
the high end of this category. In this work, Gordon's initial approach 
to a jurisprudential question is one that, he frankly admits, derives 
from others' work rather than his own,19 all en route to his own ele-
gant synthesis. Study aids written for students in a jurisprudence 
course, on the other hand, might fall at the low end of the category. 
5. The Thematic Study: This category embraces works such as 
Robert Summers's Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory,20 the 
topically organized, chronologically overlapping chapters of James 
Herget's American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970,21 and Karl Llewellyn's 
Some Realism about Realism: A Reply to Dean Pound.22 The the-
matic study attempts to canvass and elucidate manifestations of a ju-
risprudential idea, or related ideas, in the works of several authors, or 
perhaps even of one very prolific author. Writing a history of juris-
prudence can be approached, indeed, as a large-scale thematic study, 
or as a collection of thematic studies loosely organized around tempo-
ral sequence. This is a classic kind of "history of ideas." The thematic 
study will, almost by necessity, share features of 'fypes 3 and 4, and 
could present 'fype 1 material as well. 
The primary source, topical collection, critique, restatement, 
and thematic study are all unalloyed works of jurisprudence. Juris-
prudential ideas as such are their direct and immediate concern. 
15. JOEL FEINBERG & HYMAN GROSS, JUSTICE: SELECTED READINGS (1977). 
16. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 {1986). 
17. Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A 
Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613 {1986). 
18. Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 195 {1987). 
19. See id. at 201 & n.5. 
20. ROBERT SAMUELS SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTAUSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 
(1982). 
21. JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY {1990). 
22. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Reaiism: A Reply to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. 
L. REv. 1222 {1931). 
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All belong to the heartland of jurisprudence. Naturally, however, 
there are other sorts of jurisprudential writing besides these -
more specifically, works in which some other factor besides the 
ideas themselves intervenes and looms large as one organizing 
principle: 
6. The Author Study: William 1\vining's Karl Llewellyn and the 
Realist Movement23 and Robert Glennon's The Iconoclast as 
Reformer: Jerome Frank's Impact on American Law24 clearly belong 
here. This type of writing contains elements of restatement and cri-
tique, and possibly thematic study as well. Because a single individual 
serves as its focus, the author study blends ideas with biography. It 
will range from mundane details -where was he born? - to intellec-
tual chronicle - when and how did he come up with this idea? One 
reason we study a thinker's life is on the premise that his experiences 
and activities may shed light on his thinking. On the other hand, pica-
resque or baroque details of the subject's life may make a good story 
in their own right: the young Llewellyn winning the Iron Cross in 
World War I; Frank's peculiar eyeglass frames making him a suspect 
in the Leopold and Loeb murder case. Intellectual biography, it goes 
without saying, is a well-recognized type of intellectual history. 
7. The Group Study: This type of work simultaneously pursues a 
thematic and biographical approach to the works and lives of a 
number of thinkers. These will have been cohesive enough to form a 
recognized school or to constitute an interconnected group, either in 
received opinion or in a particular scholar's view.25 
8. The Contextual Study: This attempts to put jurisprudential ideas 
jn the presumptively illuminating context of something else. Such a 
work might draw upon contemporaneous social developments or dis-
ciplines besides law to elucidate jurisprudential ideas. What histori-
ans or economists were thinking, for example, might shed light on the 
jurisprudence of the same period. The contextual study is clearly a 
very important subtype of intellectual history. 
Types 6, 7 and 8 are still recognizably works of jurisprudence: 
legal-philosophical ideas lie at the center, though they may share 
that center with something else. There are, however, two last kinds 
of jurisprudence-related work that I should mention just briefly: 
9. The Biography: This differs from an author study in that the biog-
rapher minimizes or eliminates the subject's ideas in the interests of 
presenting the presumably colorful life story of a person who also 
happened to be, inter alia, a legal philosopher. Popular biographies 
23. WILUAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (rev. ed. 1985). 
24. ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S 
IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985). 
25. Examples that come to mind from outside the law are F.O. Matthiessen's study of the 
James family, THE JAMES FAMILY: A GROUP BIOGRAPHY (1947) and Humphrey Carpenter's 
THE INKLINGS (1978), a study of the lives, works and careers of the Oxford-centered British 
writers J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and so on. 
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of Justice Holmes would fall into this category. In principle, there is 
no reason why there should not be a group biography of academic 
lawyers, other than the general dullness of their lives. 
10. The "Other Hat Worn": This type of work explores the nonjuris-
prudential aspects of a legal philosopher's career, for instance, So-
and-So as procedural reformer. The more the other hat worn is sub-
stantively related to the jurisprudence hat, the more this type ap-
proaches Type 6, the author study. 
With the biography and "other hat worn," we finally have left 
the ranks of jurisprudence altogether, so attenuated has any con-
nection become. Nevertheless, someone with jurisprudential inter-
ests perhaps may learn from such a work relevant information he 
then may turn to more traditionally jurisprudential ends. 
What is the point of this apparently essentialist exercise? It is 
not to suggest that there is, in principle, anything wrong with writ-
ing a work that is "not jurisprudence" or "not purely jurispru-
dence. "26 Rather, it lets me clarify a bias: a work that falls within 
any of the first eight categories has an a priori claim on my atten-
tion as academic lawyer with an interest in jurisprudence. It also will 
help to explain some methodological observations later in this 
essay. 
Now it may turn out that I will come to regard any particular 
work of jurisprudence as wrongheaded, poorly executed, or other-
wise uncongenial, in which case my attention will diminish or in-
deed entirely lapse. But ex ante it claimed my interest by type. 
Works of the "non-jurisprudence" variety, on the other hand, start 
out with no such presumption, at least when I am reading through a 
jurisprudential lens. "Show me," I think, "the burden is on you." 
As I read it, I may decide that my initial categorization of a work 
was wrong and move it into a different, explicitly jurisprudential 
slot. Maybe a work will appeal to me while I wear a different hat. I 
may conclude that my categories were drawn too narrowly in the 
first place and that I need to expand or loosen them up. All are 
possible, but no matter. It goes to show my initial mindset and 
expectations. 
* * * 
Neil Duxbury's Patterns of American Jurisprudence21 is a re-
markable achievement. It is a thoughtful, detailed tour d'horizon of 
American jurisprudence over the last century and a quarter, from 
formalism to critical legal studies, with a glance or two beyond into 
feminism and critical race theory. The scope of his coverage is awe-
26. And here, let me again intone my apotropaic chant: the above list is not meant to be 
exhaustive. 
27. Neil Duxbury is Reader in Law at the University of Manchester in England. 
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inspmng: Duxbury apparently has read every important work of 
American jurisprudence, many not so important ones, plus a good 
deal more besides. His copious footnotes alone, if nothing else, 
guarantee that this work will become the academy's standard guide 
to the last hundred years in American jurisprudence. Duxbury de-
votes six lengthy chapters to formalism, legal realism, policy sci-
ence, process jurisprudence, law and economics, and critical legal 
studies, respectively. They provide an essential starting point for 
newcomers to these areas and offer more knowledgeable readers an 
often provocative analysis, and - in the footnotes - a wealth of 
details. 
Duxbury's approach to his topic, however, is not so much juris-
prudential as historiographic: 
The primary objective of this book is not to explore generally the 
problems that might arise from employing a handful of concepts and 
themes to explain a comparably large variety of ideas about law, but 
to try to demonstrate that our use of concepts and themes affects the 
way in which we represent the history of legal ideas. [Duxbury, 
pp. 1-2] 
In Duxbtiry's view, a pendulum-swing model has warped our prior 
understanding of the history of American jurisprudence: 
[F]irst there was formalism, epitomized by the Langdellian revolution; 
then came the realist revolt against formalism; after which came the 
renaissance of formalism, exemplified by both process jurisprudence 
and law and economics, which was superseded by the return to real-
ism in the form of critical legal studies. The pendulum of history sw-
ings back and forth, accordingly, between formalism and realism.28 
Elsewhere employing a pugilistic metaphor, he contends that "the 
history of modern American jurisprudence does not resemble a 
boxing contest ... it is not simply the trading of punches between 
formalists and anti-formalists" (p. 471). He himself, by contrast, 
speaks of a "jurisprudential drift" (p. 54) from formalism to realism. 
The distortive pendular model, Duxbury believes, has led to a 
simplistic, excessively schematic understanding of our post-
Langdellian jurisprudential history, in which "certain basic themes 
- in particular, the themes of legal formalism and legal realism" 
have been developed "in an over-emphatic, sometimes over-
dramatic, fashion" (p. 2). If we just calm down, it seems, we will 
discover "complex patterns of ideas." We will see that 
"[j]urisprudential ideas are rarely born; equally rarely do they 
die .... Ideas - along with values, attitudes and beliefs - tend to 
emerge and decline, and sometimes they are revived and refined. 
But rarely do we see them born or die. History is not quite like 
28. P. 2; see also pp. 308-09 (recapitulating the traditional account and describing it as 
"the episodic conception of the past which seems to permeate American jurisprudential 
discourse"). 
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that" (pp. 2-3). Duxbury labels his approach "jurisprudence as in-
tellectual history."29 
Many of us will recognize our own loose talk in Duxbury's de-
scription of the pendulum-swing approach, such as when we make 
in-class, off-the-cuff, quick summations en passant. Whether it re-
ally has the serious impact on our self-understanding that he sug-
gests is another matter. In so heavily footnoted a work, one would 
expect to find so central a point corroborated by long string-cites 
showing all manner of legal academics falling victim - in print and 
thus presumably at their most cautiously reflective - to this mis-
conception. For the most part I do not see the corroboration and 
indeed suspect that Duxbury's point would be hard to substantiate 
fairly,30 particularly among our major writers in jurisprudence. 
They are really not as obtuse as all that. The metaphor I would use, 
instead of a pendulum swing, is drawn from art: there are quick 
charcoal sketches and full-length oil portraits. Both have their ap-
propriate occasions. 
Part and parcel of the pendulum-swing notion is an allegedly 
binomial, either-or pairing of "formalism" and "realism-
antiformalism." Writers on American jurisprudence, this appears 
to suggest, have been wont to gloss over complications and to assign 
jurisprudential thinkers and ideas to one or the other category. Let 
us consider an example, however, that I think will illustrate a dan-
ger of writing "jurisprudence as intellectual history." At one point, 
Duxbury attempts to provide a microlevel example of his overarch-
ing theory: "[S]ome commentators," he says, have charted "a 
straight and uncluttered path from Holmes to the legal realists" that 
produces "oversimplified intellectual history" by concentrating on 
the antiformalist side of Holmes and ignoring the conflicting 
proformalist strains of his work (p. 46). In support of this allegation 
of "oversimplified intellectual history" are adduced four items of 
evidence: Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr.'s 1968 book American Legal 
Realism: Skepticism, Reform and the Judicial Process;31 Bernie R. 
Burrus's 1962 article American Legal Realism,32 Ralph J. Savarese's 
1965 article of the same name;33 and William Twining's discussion 
29. See pp. 1-7. 
30. To do this fairly would require not just isolated quotations, but an assessment of over-
all context, and perhaps even of a large body of a writer's work. 
31. WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REAUSM 38-44 (1968). The introduc-
tion to the book indicates that Mr. Rumble was on the faculty at Vassar College. 
32. Bernie R. Burrus, American Legal Realism, 8 How. LJ. 36, 37-38 (1962). Professor 
Duxbury mistakenly gives the cite as 6 How. L.J. Mr. Burrus is identified there as shortly 
about to begin as an Assistant Professor at Georgetown University Law School. 
33. Ralph J. Savarese, American Legal Realism, 3 Hous. L. REv. 180, 186-87 (1965). The 
text identifies Mr. Savarese as a member of the District of Columbia and New York bars. 
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of Holmes in his 1973 study of Karl Llewellyn.34 As I read them, 
however, two of th~se sources, Rumble and Twining, provide no 
support at all for the thesis of a commentator-distorted Holmes. 
The other two, Burrus and Savarese, provide, most charitably con-
strued, only the flimsiest kind of support. One might, indeed, have 
thought it infra dig to rely on them at all. I pick the actual nits in a 
footnote.35 My conclusion, however, is that Duxbury here does 
34. TWINING, supra note 23, at 15-20. 
35. Duxbury does not provide a definition of formalism, and I certainly shall not attempt 
it in a footnote. For purposes of making a methodological point in a book review, I proceed 
on the assumption that we have an intuitive sense of what formalism and antiformalism are. 
Interested readers doubtless will wish to consult Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
Wilfrid Rumble indeed does provide a list of features of Holmes's thought that might be 
described as antiformalist and that certain realists hence found attractive. Presumably, to 
support Duxbury's thesis, one then needs to make the argumentum e silentio: since Rumble's 
discussion does not mention the (pro-)formalist sides of Holmes's thought. it impliedly is 
representing that it did not have any, and that this allegedly significant silence distorts the 
"real" Holmes. Even granting - for the sake of discussion - that an argument from silence 
can, in principle, have this kind of probative value, it would be outbome by Rumble's accom-
panying text, which is ringed with caveats: "The correspondence between these [Holmesian 
antiformalist] ideas and those of the legal realists will become clear later in this study. The 
immediate purpose is simply to indicate those points in Holmes's overall picture of the judi-
cial process which profoundly infiuenced the views of the legal realists." Rumble, supra note 
31, at 41 (emphasis supplied). "Any attempt to draw parallels between the views of Holmes 
and those of the legal realists is, of course, dangerous. It is likely for one thing to de-
emphasize the tensions within Holmes's thinking .... [L]ike most great thinkers, his ideas are 
not without their own inner stress." Id. at 43. "An exposition of points of similarity is likely, 
also, to overemphasize the doctrinal unity within the realist movement." Id. at 44. 
William 1\vining's discussion, which Duxbury claims "treats Holmes purely as an anti-
formalist" (p. 46 n.147), indeed does cite many of Holmes's well-known antiformalist 
chestnuts: the attack on Langdell as legal theologian; the antithesis of logic and experience; 
the bad man, indifferent to "axioms or deductions," trying to determine what courts will in 
fact do. Any chance that we would come away with an image of Ollie-one-note, however, is 
diminished and perhaps eliminated by accompanying discussion and citations of some for-
malist strands in Holmes's thought as well: "[Holmes] dismissed as unenlightened the practi-
cal minded who undervalued jurisprudence ('We have too little theory in the law rather than 
too much')." TWINING, supra note 23, at 17 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, The Path 
of the Law, in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 198 (1920)). Noting that "Holmes was careful 
to dissociate himself from the anti-intellectualism and narrow-mindedness of some men of 
affairs," Twining goes on to quote another famous proformalist passage: " 'An intellect great 
enough to win the prize needs other food besides success. The remoter and more general 
aspects of law are those which give it universal interest.'" Id. at 18-19 (quoting HOLMES, 
supra, at 202). 
The discussions of Holmes by Burrus and Savarese are each a total of three paragraphs in 
length, and the majority of the text in each case is devoted to quotation of the same three loci 
clossici: the "logic and experience" passage from The Common Law, and the "bad man" and 
"cynical acid" passages from The Path of the Law. With one exception in Savarese, Duxbury 
basically has to rely on the probative value of the argumentum e silentio. In principle, such 
value is, at best, very weak. Here, it approaches zero: anyone who expects a rounded picture 
of a well-known Great Mind in three paragraphs deserves to be misled. Furthermore, I argue 
in the main text that a reader of a pure jurisprudence text - as opposed to texts of other 
kinds - has no legitimate expectation of receiving a complete portrait of the authors on 
which the text relies. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
At one point in his discussion, Savarese does veer somewhat off the edge with a reference 
to Holmes's "entirely empirical and skeptical definition of law in his celebrated essay The 
Path of the Law." Savarese, supra note 33, at 187. I would have amended the adverb to 
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precisely what he accuses others of doing: writing oversimplified 
intellectual history. Hence, when he puts on the trunks to get in the 
ring with the pendulum-swing-binomial-pairing model of American 
jurisprudential history, one winds up somehow feeling that Profes-
sor Duxbury has just K.0.-ed his own straw man. 
How does Duxbury's overconstrual of a number of secondary 
sources about Holmes illustrate a generic danger of writing "juris-
prudence as intellectual history"? To try to explain my point, let 
me first propose a number of imaginary jurisprudential statements, 
such as might be made in the different types of jurisprudential 
writing: 
1. "Experience and intuition are what judges use when they decide 
cases." (Primary Source) 
2. "It is not experience and intuition, but logic, that dictates the out-
come of cases." (Critique) 
3. "When we consider the various ways jurisprudential thinkers have 
sought to explain the judicial process, we can recognize two divergent 
strands: an experiential-intuitionalist approach and a logico-rational-
ist approach, with the latter generally predominating in standard aca-
demic discussions of the matter." (Thematic Study) 
4. "While Jones's antiformalist hons mots are the more frequently 
quoted, they in fact are equaled in number by expressions of his 
proformalist sentiments." (Author Study - Intellectual Biography) 
5. a. "Jones's well-known antiformalism can be understood better if 
we look at what his Pragmatist friends were writing at about the 
same time." (Contextual Study - Intellectual History) 
b. "Smith misinterprets Jones by referring to him as an an-
tiformalist pure and simple." (History of Ideas - Intellectual 
History). 
6. "The workings of the judicial process can be explained best as a 
mixture of logic and experience. Overemphasizing either one distorts 
the reality." (Primary Jurisprudence) 
When one chooses, as Duxbury has done, to write about juris-
prudence historically, there is, right at the outset, a hybrid mixture 
of perspectives and approaches. The core of jurisprudence is ab-
stract ideas about law, while history ultimately relates to persons. 
With the benefit of a hundred years of discussion behind us, one 
may, for example, conceivably feel the stirrings of a "purely" juris-
prudential statement like number 6, but because one is also writing 
history, one feels compelled to illustrate it - or at least the second 
half of it - with a statement like number 5(b ). Conversely, there 
"largely" myself. But this hyperbole is mitigated by the implications of Savarese's earlier 
statement that "early recognition by Holmes of the significant role of nonlogical factors in 
the judicial process can be found in [the logic-and-experience passage]." Id. at 186-87. To 
belabor the obvious, "a significant role of non-logical factors" necessarily suggests some role 
for logical ones. 
In any event, I am not aware that either the Burrus or the Savarese paragraphs have been 
crucial to the way we understand Holmes. 
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may be an obvious sequential progression, through a number of 
logical stages, from one jurisprudential concept to another. Yet be-
cause one also is writing history, because there is a story to be told, 
one feels a need to illustrate the stages of that progression with con-
crete individuals whose writing "exemplifies" them. Indeed, one 
whose view of prior historiography is premised on a dialectic model 
will go out looking for stages and doubtless will find them. The 
simultaneous imperatives of the jurisprudence-history hybrid, how-
ever, may make it hard to do either one full justice. For example, 
an Italian legal philosopher writing in another context may have an 
obvious riposte to a jurisprudential position taken by an American 
thinker, but such a response lies outside of American jurispruden-
tial history. Alternatively, people may be used distortingly as prox-
ies for ideas they occasionally expressed, or their words may be 
overconstrued so as to fill in a slot in the dialectic schema. Ideas 
are dramatized, and sometimes overdramatized, with instantiating 
"representatives," when, to do real justice to the actual people in-
volved, an author study is what is really called for. Thus, as with his 
discussion of commentators on Holmes (p. 46), I did from time to 
time feel that Duxbury was providing somewhat tendentious read-
ings of his sources. This did not occur often enough, however, to 
shake my basic faith in him as fair-minded guide. Admittedly, it is 
not always easy to distinguish "tendentious" from "different from 
my interpretation." 
There is a further methodological point to be made about the 
difference between jurisprudence and intellectual history. When 
discussing Holmes as the realists' precursor and criticizing those 
later commentators who draw a straight line from themselves back 
to the great jurist, Duxbury reproaches the realists: "Various real-
ists gleaned from Holmes all that corresponded with their particular 
versions of antiformalism, and left behind them all that did not" 
(p. 46). To which, however, the appropriate response can be only: 
"If so,36 so what?" To the extent that the realists pursued a Type-1 
jurisprudential program - by which I mean they explored or ad-
vanced their abstract ideas about law - they had no obligation to 
present a rounded portrait of Holmes. To a jurisprudent acting 
solely as such, Holmes legitimately might be regarded as a source of 
36. In support of his thesis of realists themselves distorting Holmes, Duxbury cites two 
sources: Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 352, 
356, 363 {1931) and Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 
818 (1989). In each case, there is exactly one specific instance mentioned, and it is the same 
one in both: JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). I would be delighted to 
hear an explanation of why constantly citing the most extreme representative of a particular 
movement - or "mood," as Duxbury would have it - as though he were equal to legal 
realism as a whole is not an example of "overdramatic, oversimplified" jurisprudential 
history. 
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ideas, a quarry of pithy phrasings of antiformalist insights.37 Such 
thinkers may have found Holmes's formalist side unpersuasive or 
contrary to what American jurisprudence then needed to hear. 
Perhaps they were campaigning for a temporary divorce of logic 
and experience, or perhaps a permanent one. In any case, I see no 
problem with selective quotation. Critics of realism, in turn, were 
equally free to cite only Holmes's more formalist observations. In a 
Type-5 author study, by contrast, which simultaneously must restate 
its subject's overall jurisprudence and present his intellectual his-
tory, such selectivity would be a glaring defect. I judge it inappro-
priate for Duxbury to hold the realists to the standards of another 
subfield - the author study - when they were undertaking pri-
mary jurisprudence. It is inappropriate - a category mistake - to 
treat jurisprudence like intellectual history. This is not to say that 
intellectual history should not be written about jurisprudence. But 
it pays to keep different types of ideas separate. 
Earlier on, I stated a bias in favor of a certain brand of jurispru-
dential writing, and my final critical observation must be viewed 
against that background. I would have liked for Professor Duxbury 
to talk more "across" the chapters, stepping back from the stories in 
each to give us his own views about which, if any, of the arguments 
approached a "right" answer.38 A distinctive auctorial point of 
view would have made it more the sort of jurisprudence text I pre-
fer. While I regret its absence, I also recognize that it would have 
made an already very long book even longer. 
* * * 
But enough carping about methodology. When all is said and 
done, Duxbury's work tells a richly detailed story - interspersed 
with the odd lapidary phrasing - of the intellectual enterprise 
called "American jurisprudence since Langdell." Its overall quality 
stands, despite my disagreements with various of his judgments. To 
my mind, his work reaches its best level not when summarizing, 
paraphrasing, and marshaling books of jurisprudence and law re-
view articles, but rather when it puts a particular school, movement, 
or "mood" in that jurisprudence into a nonlegal context. Especially 
good, in my view, are the discussions of legal realism's background 
in artistic and social-scientific realism and in institutional econom-
ics; the Chicago school's rootedness in the economic thought of the 
rest of the University of Chicago; and the connections between the 
37. Moreover, commentators on realism legitimately might emphasize those features of 
Holmes's thought that influenced the realists. 
38. Duxbury is, however, quite good about putting his finger on the intellectual weak-
nesses of the jurisprudential patterns he discusses, and so to that extent he does take substan-
tive positions, albeit only negative ones. See, for example, his assessment of John Hart Ely's 
version of "process" jurisprudence. See pp. 292-93. 
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nascent critical legal studies and the "New Left." Along the same 
lines, I regret that we did not hear more about pragmatism in the 
chapter on legal realism.39 
Formalism: Duxbury,s introductory chapter on legal formalism 
seeks to demonstrate that there are two strands of legal formalism, 
only one of which involves deductive legal reasoning, which he calls 
"academic formalism.,, He notes that the Socratic method, the 
anointed vehicle for the inculcation of legal formalism, actually 
arose at Columbia, not Harvard, and that Langdell was only its first 
Harvard practitioner. Langdell's pupil, James Barr Am.es, was its 
true apostle, changing its whole orientation from teaching doctrine 
to teaching legal reasoning. Duxbury makes the interesting obser-
vation that the philosophy underlying the case method - which 
Langdell apparently saw as analogous to contemporaneous innova-
tions in the teaching of chemistry - was itself illberently Darwinist: 
survival of the fittest cases. 
The more "famous,, realists like Karl Llewellyn and Jerome 
Frank tended to train their fire primarily on academic formalism. 
Duxbury, however, believes that one also should understand for-
malism to include a different, forensic formalism: the laissez-faire, 
social Darwinist approach of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century courts to, for example, labor contracts, an approach that 
deemed all parties legally equal, whatever their real economic 
power. Duxbury is not the first to undertake this renewed empha-
sis: Joseph Singer was making a similar argument in 1988,40 and 
doubtless there were others. 
Duxbury finds it inapt to speak of a "revolt against formalism"41 
in law in the sense of a sudden break with tradition by the realists. 
He tries to show, as I mentioned above, a "jurisprudential drift" 
from formalism to realism, describing the movement from one to 
the other as "very slow and hesitant" (p. 3). To do this, he looks at 
the thought of four "in-between" figures - Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, John Chipman Grey, and 
Roscoe Pound - each of whom had a foot in both camps. I doubt 
that anyone today will take exception with Duxbury,s claims about 
the four. Readers who think a "revolt" necessarily involves unprec-
edented suddenness will agree with Duxbury's conclusion that the 
realists of the late twenties and early thirties did not revolt. Others 
may think it legitimate to use that word to refer to a period when 
antiformalist elements in the thinking of certain high-visibility legal 
academics and others had come to predominate, such that it was no 
39. Duxbury's discussion of pragmatism is a little over a page long. See pp. 127-29. 
40. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 475-95 (1988) 
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). 
41. See p. 3. The phrase is Morton White's. 
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longer possible to speak of a balance of opposing tendencies. As 
Engels said somewhere, changes of quantity eventually end up be-
coming changes of quality. 
Realism: In any case, Duxbury judges realism to have been just 
a mood rather than a movement, pace Karl Llewellyn42, and cer-
tainly not a school. Having just quibbled over the word "revolt," I 
do not want to go through the same process all over again. I just 
would note that one possibly alarmist view of Duxbury's general 
strategy is to see him as minimizing realism's substantive signifi-
cance ("no big deal") while conceding its power to generate sound 
and fury ("much ado about nothing"), only later to pronounce it a 
failure.43 Readers who wonder how a mood can be a failure should 
not look to me for an explanation. 
In discussing the famous Llewellyn-Pound debate of the early 
1930s, Duxbury reaches the conclusion that "there are no good his-
torical or conceptual reasons for demarcating the prerealists from 
the realists, and that realism accordingly should be regarded as the 
continuation of a particular trend - namely, the growing dissatis-
faction with legal formalism - rather than as the beginning of 
something substantively new" (p. 77). This is rather like saying that 
because Homo sapiens is not all that genetically different from 
chimps, Homo sapiens is nothing new. It is all a matter of with 
whom you are comparing him, I suppose. On that logic, because 
there are no obvious lines of demarcation, we could make the same 
statement about orangutans, sloths, and for that matter proto-
plasms. Man, after all, is nothing new: he is still just organic 
matter. 
It is true that Llewellyn was not far removed from "protoreal-
ists" like Holmes, whom he pronounced our greatest jurist,44 or 
Cardozo, to whom he dedicated his early study of American case 
law.45 But was he not, to leave Jerome Frank quite out of the pic-
ture, already much further away than either of them from formal-
ism? Think, for example, of Llewellyn's exposition of what he 
called the "Janus-faced case method,"46 an early example of the 
radical indeterminacy thesis. At what point is it legitimate to recog-
nize a change in quantity as a change in quality? On Duxbury's 
ontology, apparently never. Yet the change in quality is, I believe, 
precisely the difference between divergent strains in establishment 
42. See Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1233-34. 
43. See, e.g., pp. 158-59, 298. 
44. See KARL LLEWELLYN, RECHT, RECHTSLEBEN UND GESELLSCHAFT 30 (1977) (1932). 
45. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA xxxi (Paul Gewirtz ed. 
& Michael Ansaldi trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1989) (1933). 
46. See id. at 46-50; K.N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BusH 74-76, 179 (Oceana Publications 
1951) (1930). 
May 1996] Jurisprudential Writing 1531 
thought and the thinking of anti-establishment mavericks. People. 
paid more attention, and the implications of their thought pene-
trated the consciousness of more and more people. 
I also think that it is just plain wrong to argue, as Duxbury does 
(pp. 130-31 ), that because realists had aspirations of predicting case 
outcomes, they were covert formalists. I see no necessary connec-
tion between a belief that case outcomes can be predicted, albeit 
with less than one hundred percent certainty, and formalism. 
Llewellyn, for one, thought that a fair amount of certainty was at-
tainable, but only such certainty as would result not from the appli-
cation of some formula but from the exercise of judgment by a 
trained lawyer focusing his attention not simply on legal logic but 
on social, sociological, and institutional factors as well. His was cer-
tainty over the run of cases, rather than certainty as regards any 
particular case: macro- but not microcertainty.47 Hence, I find 
Duxbury's contention here unpersuasive. 
I earlier complimented Duxbury for his detailed "situating" of 
legal realism in the context of realism in art and social sciences,48 
and for profiling the background of the more economic side of real-
ism in institutional economics. His story also goes over some famil-
iar terrain: the social-science leanings of certain Yale and Columbia 
faculty, the creation of the Johns Hopkins Institute for the Study of 
Law, and legal realist ideas for reforming legal education. He 
broaches less familiar territory with a discussion of realism on the 
Constitution, wherein he discerns the influence of Charles Beard, 
and with his brief but illuminating account of "Realism and the reg-
ulatory state." Here, Duxbury suggests that realist jurisprudence 
and the New Deal coincided only in a shared belief that law was or 
could be "a tool for shaping social policy" (p. 155). Also interesting 
is his treatment of Jerome Frank. He demonstrates that Frank's 
invocation of psychology in Law and the Modern Mind49 was not as 
novel as I previously had thought. Duxbury leads off his section on 
Frank in quite an original way - with a discussion emphasizing 
Frank's use of concepts of symbolism and word magic. 
Was realism ultimately just a failed mood? I am not sure that 
the success-failure matrix is the best one for assessing jurispru-
dence. We're not talking about Willy Loman here. But accepting 
the success-failure dichotomy for the moment - if you highlight 
realism's advocacy of an indissoluble marriage of law and social sci-
47. Quite apart from THE COMMON LAw TRADmON (1960), written towards the end 
of his life, Llewellyn already was making such arguments in the early 1930s. See, e.g., 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 45, at 11-12, 76-82; see also Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 
58 BROOK. L. REv. 705, 775-77 (1992). 
48. Here, I also would add the contemporaneous verismo movement in Italian opera as 
evidence of a transnational ''mood." 
49. FRANK, supra note 36. 
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ence to follow the temporary divorce of Is and Ought, as Duxbury 
does,s0 I too probably would have to find it a failure. Duxbury, 
however, goes on to state that the realists failed to construct "a con-
vincing alternative" to "the Langdellian pedagogic framework" 
(p. 158). I am not quite sure what this means. If it means that real-
ists still used the case method in their teaching, my response would 
be that they apparently found it a good tool for their purposes, and 
thus felt no need to come up with an alternative. In any case, as 
Joseph Singer has noted, realism fundamentally has altered the way 
we talk about cases.s1 Furthermore, the "cases and materials" 
teaching text the realists pioneered52 has become the standard, re-
placing the old-style Langdellian compilation of cases tout court. 
Also, while legal education has not become as clinical in approach 
as Jerome Frank might have wanted, it has moved much further in 
that direction, with increased simulated and external learning op-
portunities for law students. Law schools now pay much more at-
tention to skills other than appellate advocacy, a development of 
which Llewellyn doubtless would have approved, even while per-
haps finding it insufficient. 
What Duxbury may mean by a failure to come up with a peda-
gogic alternative to Langdellianism, however, is that realists had 
nothing to put in the place of specious deductive certainty: the 
"normative vacuum" at the heart of realism. If so, then he and I 
just view the same thing differently. What he sees as a failure, I 
regard as a success. Furthermore, I am not at all sure that they had 
nothing to put in its place; what they had to offer just may have 
been more modest and "realistic." 
Policy Science: Surely it is some indication of realism's potency, 
if not "success," that some significant part of the jurisprudence that 
followed felt obliged to respond to it, particularly to that "norma-
tive vacuum." In other words, realism got people thinking hard. 
Duxbury treats the "policy-science" jurisprudence of Harold 
Lasswell and Myres McDougal as a "failed neo-realist initiative," 
but one that now consciously poured democratic political values 
into that normative hole (p. 164). It failed because those values 
proved to be as manipulable as the vacuum itself. Once again, 
there was no there there. Logic had failed, and so too would West-
ern political values. 
Duxbury's chapter provides a very clear account of this rather 
puzzling movement. He shows how policy science took one of the 
50. See p. 158. He is not alone in this assessment: see, for example, Elizabeth Warren, 
Comments on Professor White's Paper, ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 49-55 (1988). 
51. See Singer, supra note 40, at 473-75; see also JoHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CML 
LAw TRAomoN 66-67 (2d ed. 1985). 
52. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT y ALE: 1927-1960, at 78-97 (1986). 
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weaker strains in realism - its largely long-distance love affair with 
the social sciences - and pursued it to an incomprehensible ex-
treme, to a belief that "the social sdences may be an invaluable 
source of normative guidance" (p.172), to a "utopian vision ... of a 
new world order in which social policy is generated, primarily, by 
social science" (p. 175). It may be one thing to say that society 
needs to stipulate to some values so as to be able to get along; it is 
quite another to try to wish away the contingent character of the 
stipulation by sending "science" out there to "find" the values for 
you. People were obviously desperate for a there to be there. 
Duxbury notes that Lasswell's background was as a propagan-
dist (p. 166), and it seems obvious, from a cynical post-Vietnam 
vantage point, that policy science was largely about the preaching 
of American values. These basic values -individualism, power, re-
spect, enlightenment, skill, wealth, well-being, rectitude and affec-
tions3 - were a discovered datum, and their worth "a matter 
beyond political or moral debate - they exist, as it were, 'beyond 
ethics'" (p. 178). It certainly strikes one as echt Amerikanisch to go 
around holding truths self-evident, while ignoring real-world com-
plications. Individualism is obviously a swell thing, but how far 
does it go? When the father of two young children decides he 
needs to "find himself" and skips for the coast, ·that is a highly indi-
vidualistic thing to have done, even though it probably conflicts 
with the wealth and well-being of the wife and kids.s4 Do we ap-
plaud Dad for his individualism? Reply hazy; ask again later. 
Policy science also wanted to change legal education to mold 
"lawyers of the future" and strove to create a curriculum "suitable 
for training lawyers to put democratic values into policy" (p. 180). 
Its efforts constituted, Duxbury notes, the first attempt to conceive 
of lawyering as "an overtly political endeavour" (p. 164). It never 
really caught on, at least in part because it seemed too elitist and 
impractical. It does rather smack of a three-year civics course.ss 
Process Jurisprudence: Or then again, maybe the there did not 
matter as much as how you got wherever it was you were going. 
Duxbury's title for the chapter on legal process jurisprudence, 
"Finding Faith in Reason," nicely evokes his theme. Formalism had 
"logic" and "rules"; now came "reason" and "principle." What's 
the difference between "rule" and "principle"? Principle has three 
syllables? And then too, reason is a fair bit squishier than "logic." 
53. The list changed a fair bit, and the above is my working out of what Duxbury suggests 
was a later final form. See pp. 178, 183. 
54. This example is suggested by the work of Andrew Hacker. 
55. While policy science, Duxbury notes, was generally a failure in the sense that its val-
ues ultimately were recognized as nonobjective and its program for reform of legal education 
was not accepted, it survives as an important school in international law. See pp. 196-99. 
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Emphasizing his antipendular point, Duxbury cautions us 
against the standard story in which process jurisprudence makes its 
debut in the post-World War II era as yet another response to real-
ism. He contends instead that process jurisprudence "parallels if 
not precedes legal realism itself" (p. 205). On the other hand, 
"[c]ertainly process jurisprudence began to :flourish once the mood 
of realism began to wane" (p. 205). What then is process jurispru-
dence? It, too, is not a school (p. 206), but this time an "attitude" 
toward law (p. 207)- and one "remarkably difficult to pin down," 
"tend[ing] to bobble to the surface of, rather than to dominate, the 
works of those who shared it" (p. 207). Its stirrings can be traced in 
Langdellianism and legal realism itself, and still more palpably in 
jurists of the mettle of Robert Maynard Hutchins, John Chipman 
Gray, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo. Duxbury also identi-
fies its presence in the works of a distinguished and highly diverse 
assortment of later scholars, including Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, Al-
bert Sacks, Alexander Bickel, Harry Wellington, John Rawls, Her-
bert Wechsler, and John Hart Ely. Indeed, he finds it "embedded 
in modem American jurisprudential discourse" (p. 208). 
What was distinctive about process jurisprudence, these "law-
yers with an attitude"? In retrospect, they seemed to have two 
quite sensible if not particularly remarkable insights, plus a meta-
physical belief. Process jurisprudence quite appropriately focused 
attention, first, on questions of institutional competence: "which in-
stitution within the legal process might be considered best equipped 
to deal with which problems?" (p. 233). Or, in another version, 
"the issue of what courts are good for - and not good for ... [and] 
the whole range of questions as to the appropriate relationship be-
tween the federal courts and other organs of federal and state gov-
ernment."56 It should, however, be pointed out that Llewellyn, a 
realist, already was thinking along similar lines in the late 1920s.57 
Its second insight was simply that statutes should be interpreted 
with an eye to their purpose (pp. 228-30). Today that sounds almost 
fatuous, but obviously once it did not. 
These aperfus, which seem more in the nature of midlevel polit-
ical theory than jurisprudence, have little if anything to say about 
non-statutory adjudication. They were accompanied, however, by a 
56. P. 236 (quoting HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xii (1953)); see also pp. 255-62 (reviewing Hart and Sacks on 
institutional competence). 
57. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 45, at 66-68; cf. id. at 101-04. (This work was published 
in 1933, but the relevant portions had been completed by the beginning of 1930.) See id. at 
xxxvii. Lon Fuller, who was one of Duxbury's process jurisprudents to focus attention on 
institutional competence, see infra text accompanying note 61, had read this work of Llewel-
lyn's. See Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934); L.L. Fuller, 
Book Review, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 551 (1934). 
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related faith in reason and a belief in consensus, which turn out to 
be not especially helpful for common-law judging, despite initial ap-
pearances. In an attempt to differentiate appropriate roles for 
courts and for legislatures, process jurisprudence ventured that 
while legislatures may set policy, courts must decide by principles, 
which they can locate through reason. What made something a 
principle rather than a policy? Why, the fact that courts could use it 
but not the other. 
When they stepped off the semantic merry-go-round, process 
lawyers generally failed to make things any clearer. They were 
chasing a distinction without much if any substantive difference. 
Over and over and over again, principle and policy collapsed into 
the reality of judicial and legislative choice. You say to-may-to, I 
say to-mah-to; the fact that one plant grows in my garden and the 
other in yours does not make either of them any less a Lycopersicon 
esculentum. 
If reason, ultimately, is just shorthand for the idea that judges 
and other decisionmakers should reflect before they act, amen to 
that. Yet, somehow I find apodictic assurances that reason - or 
reasoned elaboration,ss or whatever you call it - will lead to 
unarguably right answers consistently underwhelming. I have never 
really gone in much for the oracular style of argumentation. Low-
ering a deus ex machina onto the set remains as plausible as it ever 
was. Sometimes, alas, it seems as if Walter Wheeler Cook, Jerome 
Frank, and Karl Llewellyn might never have written a word. 
Of the whole process movement, Alexander Bickel's philosophy 
of judicial prudence, which postulated that judges should some-
times stifle themselves by making the essentially political judgment 
not to follow a principle out to its nth implication, came closest to 
practical wisdom - not to mention the reality of what goes on. A 
principle that does not have to be followed all the time sounds sus-
piciously like one policy colliding with a competing policy. Such a 
situation obviously calls for judgment, not reason. 
Law and Economics:59 Although there certainly were Ameri-
can lawyers interested in law and economics before the rise of the 
Chicago school, in Duxbury's opinion there was nothing cohesive 
enough to be called a law and economics movement. Those who 
58. Seep. 259 (discussing Hart and Sacks on reasoned elaboration). 
59. Indulging a version of his antipendular bent yet again, Professor Duxbury begins his 
chapter on the law and economics movement with a perhaps less than entirely riveting dis-
quisition on whether that movement is or is not related to legal realism, critical legal studies, 
and process jurisprudence, and if so in what way and how much. It is not that the topic is out 
of place in such a work, but that it is out of place at the beginning of a chapter. Such a 
relatively detailed discussion would be better placed in an appendix: how can readers possi-
bly assess the merits of his genealogical analysis before being told about either law and eco-
nomics itself or critical legal studies, the subject of the following chapter? 
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did discuss law and economics during that time tended to distrust 
courts as makers of economic policy due to judicial adherence to 
laissez-faire principles; they looked instead to legislatures to fulfill 
that role. They also tended to regard market failures as a common 
phenomenon, fully correctable through governmental regulation. 
Most of modern law and economics springs from very different 
sources. As I have noted already, Duxbury provides a quite inter-
esting account of the competing personalities - including Milton 
Friedman - and theories in the University of Chicago's economics 
department, before and after its institutional embrace of neoclassi-
cism. Disagreement in that department, in fact, led to the appoint-
ment in 1939 of a junior professor from its ranks to become the law 
school's first economist (p. 335). 
Once again, Duxbury guides us away from an overly simplified 
history. There was no neat division between the "old" Chicago 
school of the 1940s and 1950s, which supposedly applied economic 
theory only to the more obviously economic areas of law like anti-
trust, tax, corporate law, and public utilities, and the "new" Chicago 
school of the 1960s and after, which purportedly then sought to ex-
tend such analysis into "non-market areas of legal activity" as well 
(pp. 380-81). While the simplification is not entirely devoid of 
truth, we learn in fact that during the mid-1940s "the seeds of the 
'new' law and economics [already] were being planted" (p. 341). 
Be that as it may, in that earlier period antitrust law unquestion-
ably served as a key focus of the Chicago school. Under the gui-
dance of Aaron Director, an economist who came to be what 
Duxbury calls a general eminence grise of the Law School, the Chi-
cago school took the position that "the prevalence of private mo-
nopoly" was "exaggerated" (p. 338). It contended that since "it is 
virtually impossible to eliminate competition from economic life ... 
monopolies are essentially unstable [because] new competitors will 
emerge" (p. 345). Accordingly, it concluded that "regulation is the 
proper function of markets rather than governments" (p. 343). This 
view of antitrust law generated a great deal of criticism, much of it 
coming from Harvard. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, "Chicago-
inspired economic analysis was beginning clearly to dominate de-
bate about antitrust policy in the United States" (p. 355), and this 
domination has continued, in part, because of the appointment of 
Chicago-style law and economics jurists to the federal bench during 
the Reagan and Bush presidencies. 
As mentioned, this style of economic analysis eventually would 
be applied extensively to other areas of law, such as property law, 
that at first blush did not seem amenable to economic treatment. A 
key stage in this development was Ronald Coase's pioneering work 
on transaction costs, as well as his enunciation of the "Coase theo-
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rem," which held that in the absence of transaction costs "the legal 
assignment of property rights to parties involved in negotiation 
would have no effect on the eventual allocation of resources be-
tween them" (p. 387). As with its antitrust theories, the newer 
"nonmarket" applications of Chicago law and economics did not go 
unchallenged. This time the most pointed criticism emanated from 
Yale. Guido Calabresi thus summarized law and economics' 
limitations: 
"[E]conomic theory ... cannot tell us how far we want to go to save 
lives and reduce accident costs. Economic theory can suggest one ap-
proach - the market - for making the decision. But decisions bal-
ancing lives against mon~y or convenience cannot be purely monetary 
ones, so the market method is never the only one used." ... [C]ertain 
activities may be sustainable in market terms, [but] they may be pro-
hibited for the simple reason that "there are some things we do not 
want in our society regardless of costs."60 
Duxbury concludes his chapter with an account of the career of the 
most vigorous academic advocate of an expansivist application of 
economic analysis to law: the "demonized" Richard Posner and his 
efficiency and wealth-maximization principles. 
Critical Legal ~tudies: Duxbury finds the pendulum theory to 
have some validity here, though not in the way one might at first 
imagine: CLS is not a revival of realism, but it is a reaction by some 
segments of American law against the appeals to consensus and in-
dividualism implicit both in process jurisprudence and law and eco-
nomics. Furthermore, unlike the "amorphous" mood that was 
realism, CLS qualifies as a real "movement" because it has been 
"more co-ordinated, institutionalized and clearly self-identified" (p. 
425). . 
Duxbury begins his discussion with "the political backdrop," i.e., 
the New Left, university-based beginnings of the movement, as' well 
as the "law and development" programs at Harvard, Yale, Stanford, 
and Wisconsin, which attempted " 'to formulate valid generaliza-
tions about the relationships between law and the major economic, 
social, and political transformations associated with industrializa-
tion.' "61 These programs provided the training ground for the "law 
and society movement," which Duxbury depicts as a partial precur-
sor to CLS. But some who had originally been more sympathetic to 
the law and society movement ultimately grew critical of its apoliti-
cal style of analysis and its failure to recognize law's ideological 
side. 
60. P. 393 (quoting Guroo CALABRESI, THE CoST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 18, 100 (1970)). 
61. P. 437 (quoting David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the 
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1972)). 
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CLS was "invented" in the late 1970s as a perception began to 
form that there was a "growing leftist presence in the law schools" 
(p. 447). A committee organized to plan a conference and draw up 
a list of who was to be invited. The first Conference on Critical 
Legal Studies, held in May of 1977 at the University of Wisconsin, 
produced both good scholarship and a fair amount of backbiting. 
Duxbury surveys the works of a number of the best-known 
"Crits," including Morton Horwitz, Roberto Unger, and Duncan 
Kennedy. He observes that Horwitz's scholarship "endeavours to 
demonstrate that American judges, from the late eighteenth cen-
tury onwards, began to mould common law doctrine so that it 
favoured mercantile, as opposed to other group interests within so-
ciety" (p. 451). Unger's work, by contrast, he views as visionary, 
aimed at total critique and social transformation. He notes, how-
ever, that "the nature of the post-liberal, solidaristic society is 
something about which Unger is only able to speculate" (p. 455). 
Finally, Duxbury summarizes Kennedy's intellectual project 
throughout the 1970s, the so-called indeterminacy thesis, as an 
"elaborat[ion of] ... the tensions inherent in liberal legal thought 
and doctrine" (p. 457). 
In its heyday, the 1980s, CLS grew, in Robert Gordon's words, 
"so exotically varied and internally divided as to defy characteriza-
tion almost entirely."62 Although older themes continued to be de-
veloped, new ones came to the fore, including "the inadequacy of 
rights discourse and the viability of nihilism as a basis for a legal 
theory" (p. 470). Duxbury also notes the emergence of "trashing" 
and the publication of the first edition of the CLS reader The 
Politics of Law. 63 Roberto Unger, meanwhile, continued to write 
about the society of the future, to which Duxbury responds with no 
little exasperation and a rather tart in-joke: 
Assuming that the types of institutional revision deemed necessary 
for the transition from liberalism to post-liberalism could ever be ef-
fectuated, why should we wish to commit ourselves to such an up-
heaval? Yet again, Unger confesses and avoids. The first three 
volumes of Politics "merely suggest the outline of a vision that needs 
to be worked out later." So many books, pages and words, and Unger 
is still promising to deliver the goods next time. God, it seems, has 
not yet spoken.64 
Here, Duxbury reveals his basic good sense: considering that law 
professors are generally the sort of people with whom one prefers 
to avoid even having lunch, one certainly does not want to live in a 
62. P. 467 (quoting Robert W. Gordon, Law and Ideology, 3 TIKKUN 14, 15 (1988)). 
63. THE Pouncs OF LAw (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
64. P. 481 (quoting ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 560 (1987)). 
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society designed by them. One faculty meeting will convince any-
one of that. 
As with Judge Posner, Duxbury tells of the demonization of 
CLS, recounting the faculty tensions at Harvard - once described 
by David Trubek as "the Beirut of legal education" - and the 
brouhaha generated by a suggestion that adherents of CLS did not 
belong in legal academe. Duxbury draws a nice parallel between 
the Crits' reactions to the latter and the earlier relationship be-
tween the New Left and the universities: Academe was an evil club 
in which the dissidents nonetheless wanted full membership . 
. It may be time to switch to the past tense when discussing CLS, 
Duxbury implies, because it "peaked in the American law schools 
in the middle of the 1980s and has been losing momentum ever 
since" (p. 426). If CLS is moribund, why? There are any number of 
reasons, of which Duxbury highlights three: the appeal of 
neopragmatism, generational conflicts within the movement, and 
the fissuring off of feminism and critical race theory. Here, in any 
event, I revert to my earlier question: does the success-failure 
model, to which the "death" idea is obviously related, provide the 
correct framework for judging jurisprudence? Even if the CLS 
movement dies, - in the sense, for example, that people who call 
themselves Crits cease to foregather as such - we still must ask 
whether, and how much, such a way of thinking has enriched or 
sharpened our knowledge of the law, our own personal jurispru-
dence. That, I think, is the question we need to ask about all the 
schools, or movements, or moods that Duxbury has so thoroughly 
and ably chronicled. 
* * * 
What and whomever else he may have meant, we know for cer-
tain that Emil Cioran cannot have been referring to American juris-
prudence or its creators when he alluded to the fascinations of 
gossip and metaphysics. On the metaphysical side, the most endur-
ing achievements of American jurisprudence have, to my mind, 
largely been negative. Of a profession that so vaunts its allegedly 
Socratic methods, it is particularly fitting to say that, metaphysi-
cally, we are stalled in the aporia of the early Platonic dialogues. 
And gossip? Odium philologicum, the renowned pettiness of book-
men, schemes and squabbles over matters of little import - these 
would be mostly our topic here, supplemented no doubt by the odd 
drunk or seducer. Fairly tame stuff; entertaining enough in the 
hands of a C.P. Snow, David Lodge, or F.M. Cornford. 
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Neil Duxbury seeks to write jurisprudence as intellectual his-
tory. John Henry Schlegel,65 author of American Legal Realism 
and Empirical Social Science, writes in a rather different key: 
I believe that intellectual history, as traditionally understood as a his-
tory of ideas embodied in texts, is an essentially empty exercise, 
though intelligible as the practice of a group of historians who partici-
pate in a professional identity that sees history as a largely autono-
mous enterprise of academics responding to other academics. Rather 
than a history of ideas, intellectual history needs to be the history of 
intellectuals, people who do things with ideas - in this case in an 
academic setting. [Schlegel, pp. 4-5] 
In an afterword to his book, he writes, in a still more radical vein: 
It is time we consider giving up the history of ideas, giving up intellec-
tual history as a history of the ideas of humans set apart from the rest 
of their lived experience, and to begin to write the history of intellec-
tuals .... Let us simply stop the pretense that it is the dance of reason 
that we chronicle in intellectual history, if only in the name of more 
accurately representing the thinkers of the past as that humanistic 
ideal - people trying their best to get from Monday to Tuesday in as 
honorable a job as they have managed to find. Let us stop looking for 
the dance of reason and record the whole dance of life. [Pp. 260-61] 
Schlegel's subject, a relatively small slice of Duxbury's, was 
largely unknown until Schlegel's publication of a series of articles, 
now reworked and expanded in this book. His subject is the empir-
ical legal research done by some, but by no means all, of the histori-
cal legal realists - including Dean Charles E. Clark, William 0. 
Douglas, W. Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook, Herman 
Oliphant, Leon Marshall, and Hessel Yntema.66 So important was 
65. Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. 
66. Schlegel is certainly free to study whatever scholars, or groups of scholars, he sees fit, 
and the Columbia-Yale-Johns Hopkins focus makes obvious sense. But I fear his pique at 
Karl Llewellyn's disparaging remarks about the empirical work of his en/ant protl!ge 
Underhill Moore and that of the Hopkins quartet, see pp. 146, 200, has led him to slight 
Llewellyn's place in the story he is telling of realist involvement with the social sciences. 
When describing how the focus of his own work would be different from that of William 
Twining's 1973 study of Llewellyn, see TWINING, supra note 23, Schlegel writes: "Since Llew-
ellyn's major interests were jurisprudence and commercial law, (Twining's] biography could 
not have given a central place to empirical research by the Realists because Llewellyn never 
really engaged in any." P. 6 (emphasis supplied). 
While it is certainly true that the amount of empirical research done by Llewellyn was not 
of the same order as that of, say, Moore or Clark, Schlegel appears to have forgotten about 
KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HoEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941), or the numerous 
summers in the late 1940s that Llewellyn did field work among the Pueblo in the American 
Southwest, yielding, admittedly, little other than "extensive field notes." TWINING, supra 
note 23, at 359. See generally Wolfgang Fikentscher, Die Erforschung des lebenden Rechts in 
einer multikulturellen Gesel/schaft: Karl N. L/ewellyns Cheyenne- und Pueblo-Studien, in 
RECHTSREALISMUS, MULTIKULTURELLE GESELLSCHAFT UNO HANDELSRECHT: KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN UNO SEINE BEDEUTUNG HEUTE 45 (Ulrich Drobnig & Manfred Rehbinder eds., 
1994) [hereinafter DROBNIGIREHBINDER COLLECTION]. Naturally, this was not quantitative 
work, but it nonetheless qualifies as "empirical." Schlegel perhaps might respond that, even 
so, most of the data collection in each case was done by people other than Llewellyn himself. 
See TWINING, supra note 23, at 155, 358. But the same also could be said about most, if not 
May 1996] Jurisprudential Writing 1541 
this work, Schlegel seems at times to suggest, that it may necessitate 
a revision of our basic concept of what legal realism was, to bring it 
in line with his view of intellectual history: "realism is best under-
stood as something that the realists did."67 At other points, he 
seems less insistent on the sole correctness of defining realism in his 
way and no other.6s 
That is just as well. It would make no sense to me to exclude 
the realists' jurisprudence, their most enduring contribution to 
American law, from consideration altogether. Sensibly, Schlegel 
does not do so. In principle I am either, as jurisprudential reader, 
open to ha~g my understanding deepened by the presentation of 
jurisprudential ideas set against the backdrop of a writer's whole 
life and work, or, as nonjurisprudential reader, open to being told 
an interesting nonjurisprudential story. 
On my earlier schema, Schlegel's work probably would be de-
scribed as a mixture of the clearly jurisprudential "Group Study" 
(Type Seven) on the one hand, and the nonjurisprudential "Biogra-
phy/Other Hat Worn" (Types Nine and Ten) on the other. Based 
on his earlier programmatic credo, I am quite sure Professor Schle-
gel would not be bothered by a claim that his work was "not juris-
prudence," on my fairly traditional understanding of the same. 
all, of the realists Schlegel studies. Indeed, one aptly might describe the r~lationship between 
Llewellyn and his Columbia junior colleague Hoebel in roughly the same way Schlegel con-
ceives of the relations between Moore, Clark and William 0. Douglas, on the one hand, and 
the professional social scientists Dorothy Thomas and Emma Corstvet on the other: provid-
ing technical expertise on social-scientific methodology. Even though Llewellyn and 
Hoebel's field work among the Cheyenne would not satisfy the methodological requirements 
of contemporary anthropology, see Flkentscher, supra, at 54-55, The Cheyenne Way can 
nonetheless be said to have "inaugurated a new style of legal anthropology." Fikentscher, 
supra, at 55. 
Not precisely germane to Schlegel's observation on Llewellyn's engaging in empirical re-
search, yet still obviously related, is Llewellyn's posthumously published RECHT, RECHT-
SLEBEN UNO GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 44, a theoretical work in which Llewellyn sought "to 
'open up' the field of legal sociology, to offer it a possible program ..• tentatively proposing a 
few daring hypotheses and 'fantasies' about the way legal sociology might eventually organ-
ize its observations of the 'life of the law' in the context of the larger society." Ansaldi, supra 
note 47, at 746 (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra note 44). Perhaps Schlegel would count this as 
"cheerleading" for empirical social science, but such a characterization only would tend to 
assimilate Llewellyn to one of Schlegel's subjects, Walter Wheeler Cook. One wonders, in 
fact, whether any realist of the period, with the possible exception of Moore, thought about 
social science as systematically as Llewellyn did in this 1932 work. All in all, it is rather odd 
for one whose primary reputation abroad is for his sociolo·gy of law, see William Twining, The 
Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, in DROBNIG/REHBINDER COLLECTION, 
supra, 11, 72-73, Schlegel, pp. 45-186 passim, to figure so queerly in a work on American 
legal realism and the social sciences, empirical and otherwise. 
67. P. 2. The phrase seems to echo Llewellyn's famous sentence in the Bramble Bush 
lectures, "What these [legal] officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself." 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 46, at 3. 
68. "I suppose that there is nothing wrong with jurisprudes discussing Realism as juris-
prudence, timeless answers to what are taken as timeless questions. For historians, though, it 
is a matter of some consequence whether Realism is seen as a jurisprudence rather than 
Realists[] as having or sharing a jurisprudence." P. 4. 
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Whether his work tilts toward one or the other end of the spectrum 
will depend on whether I think the nonjurisprudential material he 
presents illuminates my understanding of ideas. If it does not, or 
not primarily, the burden falls on him to show why I should be in-
terested in his material. Perhaps his story is intrinsically interesting; 
perhaps it manifestly bears on other important concerns of aca-
demic lawyers; perhaps Schlegel's analysis exposes some latent 
bearing on those concerns. 
Clark and Douglas: The realist social scientists named above all 
were associated with Columbia, Yale and Johns Hopkins, or some 
combination thereof. Charles Clark and William 0. Douglas of 
Yale each began his empirical work in connection with some pro-
gressive law reform project. In Clark's case, it was procedural re-
form. The perceived need for such reform reflected in part a widely 
shared belief that "procedure was too technical and complicated 
and, as a result, allowed lawyers imbued with 'the sporting theory 
of justice' to avoid decisions on the merits of claims by playing pro-
cedural games" (p. 83). The narrow topic of Clark's project, on 
which he collaborated with Douglas, was the adjudication of civil 
cases by Connecticut courts. In the course of this work he learned 
of and ultimately adopted some of the values of the newly quanti-
fying social sciences. 
After a few months of field work, he concluded that state court 
civil litigation "was largely administrative," and he found that "jury 
trials were infrequent" (p. 83). From this, Clark "wonder[ ed] about 
the appropriateness of using complex judicial machinery to resolve 
such apparently simple disputes" (p. 83). He later expanded his 
study to courts outside Connecticut, to criminal cases, and to a 
longer time period. 
The results of the study of criminal cases flew in the face of the 
conventional wisdom: rather than finding widespread delay, 
"eighty-five percent of the cases were disposed in two months" 
(p. 89). In fact, Clark consistently concluded that the criminal pro-
cess was almost too efficient. The study's sponsors, however, who 
had vested interests in the original reformist thesis, excluded these 
findings from the final report. On the civil side, two findings - that 
federal courts' diversity jurisdiction accounted for under twenty 
percent of filed cases and that those that were filed were fairly sim-
ple cases - upset some sponsors and delighted others, depending 
on the types of reforms they endorsed. The data also showed that 
" [ e ]ssentially uncontested matters - collections, divorces, and fore-
closures - together with the largely settled matters, primarily tort 
cases, dominated the docket" (p. 92). Such evidence, however, 
proved "by and large irrelevant to the cause of reform as [Clark and 
his collaborators] knew it, since in a system where most cases are 
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uncontested or settled, technical procedure played little part, and 
thus to expend effort at its reform made little sense" (p. 92). 
Schlegel describes Clark's ensuing bewilderment and disappoint-
ment over the sponsors' conclusions that: 
the fact that Clark's fact gathering was a "scientific" enterprise made 
no difference. Fact gathering that did not advance an immediate re-
form objective was scholarship not worth publishing, just as fact gath-
ering that did not fit their model of how the world was structured was 
an "irrelevant jumble of figures." They would give or withhold their 
support for the newer empirical research in law just as they had for 
the older, less structured research. [pp. 97-98] 
Clark undertook another empirical study, this time of the com-
pensation received by auto accident victims, while Douglas studied 
business failures and focused in particular on the administration of 
the bankruptcy laws. Two nonlawyer professional social scientists 
- Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Emma Corstvet - collaborated on 
both projects, attempting to perfect the methodologies being fol-
lowed. Yet lawyers and social scientists, Schlegel says, gradually 
drifted apart: the lawyers were called away to seemingly more at-
tractive activities, having proved less than fully willing to regard 
facts as having much independent value, apart from some specific 
purpose; the social scientists, on the other hand, remained chiefly 
interested in making social observation a thoroughly professional, 
quantitative science. 
Johns Hopkins: One item of fallout from the "Deanship Crisis" 
on the Columbia Law School faculty in 1928 - engendered when 
Columbia's President Nicholas Murray Butler passed over Herman 
Oliphant for the deanship - was the departure of Oliphant and 
two colleagues, Hessel Yntema and economist Leon Marshall, for 
Johns Hopkins University. There they joined Walter Wheeler 
Cook, who was then in the process of planning "a nonteaching, re-
search institute for law" (p. 147). Each of the four faculty members 
"was to head up a 'practically independent' research unit" (p. 159). 
The research projects ultimately would encompass a study of the 
Ohio and Maryland court systems; litigation in New York; install-
ment sales; and concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state 
courts. In reality, however, these lawyers-empiricists generally 
lacked a clear sense of the purpose of their ultimately short-lived 
Institute. Schlegel's account indicates that there was not an enor-
mous amount of enthusiasm among the four participants for actu-
ally doing empirical research of the sort that Clark and Douglas 
would be doing at Yale. That lack of enthusiasm, coupled with the 
administrative chores associated with a newly founded institution, 
the absence of secure funding, the incomprehension and jealousy of 
the rest of the Hopkins faculty, and the Depression, ultimately 
killed the Institute off. 
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Underhill Moore: Perhaps the most impressive achievement of 
Schlegel's book is its revisionist account of Underhill Moore - pro-
fessor first at Columbia, then at Yale. Both Moore and Cook, as 
Schlegel describes them, belonged to one of the first generations of 
law teachers whose professional identity was as academics who 
were supposed to participate in the grand scholarly enterprise of 
keeping the post-Langdell formalist edifice of the law in good re-
pair (pp. 25-26). Their lives ran parallel in other ways as well, their 
paths often crossing. They both began their careers in "colonial 
service" at law schools west of the Hudson and east of the Rockies 
doing traditional sorts of scholarship, then each gradually worked 
his way back to "civilization" on the East Coast (p. 67). Also, they 
jointly encountered the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey at Co-
lumbia, and that shared experience changed both their professional 
lives: Cook became a cheerleader for law and the social sciences, 
while Moore sloughed off his law professor identity and assumed 
that of a social-scientist wannabe (pp. 24-25, 57-62). Indeed, of all 
the realist lawyers who did social science work, Moore, in Schlegel's 
account, took most seriously the methodological demands of the 
field, and he thus broke free of the nexus between empirical re-
search and reform. 
Before the Schlegelian rehabilitation, it is safe to say that many 
people regarded Moore as a sort of law professor-madman, sitting 
outside in shorts and pith helmet counting cars. Schlegel's not in-
considerable achievement is to have converted our reaction from 
ridicule to pity, and perhaps even to outright sympathy. In all 
Moore's empirical research - from his study of banks' debiting of 
direct discounts and bank practices on recrediting stopped certified 
checks, to the famous parking studies - his methodological under-
standing of the social sciences grew progressively more sophisti-
cated, whether he was studying the relation between law and 
custom or applying stimulus-response psychology to law-related be-
havior. This sophistication came about in part through his collabo-
ration with Thomas and Corstvet, whose advice, admittedly, he did 
not always follow. But the rub was that he was lonely and misun-
derstood: the other Yale law professors at best did not understand 
him and at worst mocked him, and the professional social scientists 
at Yale's Institute for Human Relations considered him an amateur. 
* * * 
I have barely outlined the "story" Schlegel tells about the em-
pirical work done by legal realists. A number of essentially set 
pieces that help to provide context fore and aft accompany his tale; 
they include sections on the professionalization of law teaching, the 
"colonial service," and the last chapter on the not particularly edify-
ing subsequent history of social science research in American law 
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schools. All are illuminating and well done. Schlegel also must be 
commended for his expanded definition of the realist controversy, 
which includes not just the Llewellyn-Pound debate, but also the 
earlier Columbia Law Review symposium on Jerome Frank's Law 
and the Modern Mind. 69 
But again I must revert to my starting point. Schlegel's book is 
not jurisprudence, or even jurisprudential history, in anything ap-
proaching a classical sense. Truthfully, I do not find it to have 
thrown much of a sidelight on jurisprudential ideas as such. But 
such was not his intent. If I read his book through different specta-
cles, I find much that is quite interesting, including, most especially, 
his above-mentioned set pieces and his own analyses of his col-
lected data, placed at the end of each of the three middle chapters. 
On the other hand, there is all that data itself, narrative and 
personal detail. Must we really be frogmarched through every last 
letter and memo of anyone who ever wrote on any aspect of the 
Hopkins Institute, and through every last methodological problem 
in questionnaire design? After a while, it gets to be about as stimu-
lating as biblical genealogy. While Professor Schlegel disclaims any 
desire "to do a von Ranke" (p. 12), his presentation of such volumi-
nous data, in his effort to show us wie es eigentlich war, is nonethe-
less quite Germanic in its power to overwhelm with detailed 
thoroughness. Quite frankly, a lot of it is not very interesting and 
easily could have been condensed without any loss of confidence in 
the subsequent discussion and analysis. The book also needed a 
good copy editing. But it would be churlish to end on the warts; so 
instead I will finish by stating that students of realism, and of legal 
academe moF generally, are in Schlegel's debt for his rescue of 
realism's forgotten legacy. 
69. See Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 82 (1931). 
